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RECENT DECISIONS.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER OF AUTOMOBILES

TO PERSONS NOT IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT WITH

HIm.-Plaintiff

bought an automobile of a retail dealer, who, in turn, had purchased it from defendant manufacturer. While giving the machine normal use, plaintiff was injured by the collapse of one of
the wheels, due to defective wood. Defendant had bought .the
wheel from another manufacturer, but there was evidence that its
defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection. Held,
defendant liable. (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., N. Y. Court
of Appeals, March 14, 1916.)
The Court of Appeals, in an exhaustive opinion by Cardozo, J.,
dissenting opinion by Willard Bartlett, Ch. I., affirmed herein
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 160 App. Div. 55. For a discussion of the point involved, see article "Are Automobiles Inherently Dangerous to the Purchaser?" by judge Pound of the Court
of Appeals in 2 Fordham Law Review, page 57 (March, 1916),
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wherein the Appellate Division decision of the principal case is
cited.
WILLS-RIGHTS OF POSTHUMOUS CHILD-RPRESENTATION.--

Testator left three children, Joseph, Mary and Lydia. Joseph
died, leaving eight children and several grandchildren. By the
testator's Will all the residue of his estate was left to his executors, in trust, to divide the same into two equal parts and to apply
the income of one part to the use of Mary; and upon her decease,
such interest to go to her issue and, if she should die without issue,
to such persons as she should designate by her Will. Upon the
failure of both contingencies, such share was to be assigned to
Joseph and Lydia and in case of the death of either or both, then
such share was to be assigned to their issue, such issue to take
the share which his, her or their parent would have taken if
living. In an action to remove the trustee and to set aside an
instrument of division of the realty, the eight children of Joseph
were cited. One, Lester, died subsequently, leaving a child en
ventre sa mere. Upon motion to join as parties the grandchildren
of Joseph and to stay the proceedings till the birth of Lester's
child, Held, that the grandchildren of Joseph, whose living parents
are parties, take by representation and are not necessary parties;
that the unborn child has an interest in the proceeding and the stay
should be granted. (Kane v. Odell, Appellate Division, First Department, March, 1916.)
A descendant or relative to the intestate, begotten before his
death, but born thereafter, shall inherit in the same manner as if
he had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived
him. (Dec. Est. Law, Sec. 93.) Posthumous children become
entitled, when born, to take in the same manner as if living at the
death of their parents. (Real Prop. Law, Sec. 56.) A child
en ventre sa mere shall be considered in esse for most purposes
of property. (Mason v. Jones, 2 Barb. 251.) Hence, such children have rights which must be protected (Monarque v. Monarque,
80 N. Y. 320). Their interest cannot be concluded by judgment
in any proceeding to which they were not parties or in which
they were not represented (Giles v. Solomon, 10 Abb. Pr. N. C. 97,
Note; Downey v. Seib, 185 N. Y. 427; Smith v. Secor, 157 N. Y.
402). A judgment binds only parties and their privies (Adami v.
Gerceken, 164 App. Div. 472). This maxim is subject to the rule
"adopted partly from necessity and partly of considerations of
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convenience" (Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210) that where an
estate is vested in persons living subject only to the contingency
that persons may be born who will have an interest therein, such
living owners of the estate, for all purposes of litigation in reference thereto and affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with
the same, represent the whole estate and stand not only for themselves but also for persons unborn (Kent v. Church of St. Michael,
136 N. Y. 10). Such persons must have a like interest with the
children not in esse, and due provision must be made in the judgment for the unborn children by setting apart land or the proceeds of land to represent, in some form, their interests (Mead v.
Mitchell, supra; Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 446; Adami v.
Gercken, supra).
The word "issue" usually means a per capita distribution
(Schmidt v. Jewett, 195 N. Y. 486; Matter of Bauerdorf, 77 Misc.
663). But the intention of the testator governs (Ferrerv. Pyne,
81 N. Y. 281) and here the direction that the issue shall take the
parent's share shows an intention that the residue should descend
per stirpes (Barstow v. Goodwin, 2 Bradf. 413). It is, therefore,
correctly held that the great-grandchildren take by representation,
and since their parents are parties to the action, their interests
are protected (Matter of Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 213 N. Y.
168).
The child en ventre sa mere will also take by representation,
but its father, through whom it claims, is not a party to this action.
The rule in Kent v. Church of St. Michael, supra, would seem not
to be applicable in the case of a child already begotten, since such
child is regarded as living at the time of its father's death (Cooper
v. Heatherton, 65 App. Div. 561). Since it is in esse and not represented in any manner, the stay, we submit, was properly granted.
It is apparent that in such cases it may be impossible to construe a will or determine conflicting claims to real property within
reasonable limits of time. A solution of the difficulty may be
found in a resort to Section 426, Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended in 1913. Under this amendment it is no longer necessary to serve the infant under fourteen with process. A child
en ventre sa mere is held, even in the principal case, a natural
person. Being under fourteen years of age, its rights may be
protected by service upon some competent person, designated by
the Court on behalf of such infant. The appointment of a guardian ad litem may then be had, pursuant to Sections 469 et seq.
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of the Code. "An infant en ventre sa mere may have a guardian
assigned to it" (Blackstone's Comm. Bk. I *130). All the elements required by Section 426 would seem to be present so as to
justify its application to this case.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS OVER
A 'TRANSACTION NOT ARISING WITHIN THE STATE.-In an action

by a resident against a foreign corporation doing business in the
State, on a cause of action arising without the State, held, service
of process upon the agent designated by the corporation for accepting service, is proper and should not be set aside. (Bagdon v.
Philadelphia& Reading Coal & Iron Co., N. Y. Court of Appeals,
March 14, 1916.)
Sec. 1780 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for cases
where a foreign corporation may be sued in the courts of this
State. That section gives a resident the right to sue "for any
cause of action", while a non-resident is subject to certain restrictions therein enumerated. The constitutionality of Section 1780
has been questioned (Grant v. Cananea Con. Copper Co., 117
App. Div. 576; Sadler v. B. & B. Rubber Co., 140 App. Div.
367; Fairclough v. Southern Pacific Co., N. Y. Law Journal,
March 17th, 1916), but the Court of Appeals has expressly dedared that the provisions of Section 1780 were not violative of
any provision in the Federal Constitution. (Grant v. Cananea
Con. Copper Co., 189 N. Y. 241.) The Supreme Court of the
United States has never passed upon the point.
The New York Courts and the Federal Courts have for many
years been in conflict regarding the validity of service on a foreign corporation. In Pope v. Terre Haute Mfg. Co., 87 N. Y. 137,
it was held that service on the president of a foreign corporation
while travelling through this State on his way to a seaside resort
was good, and gave the New York Courts jurisdiction. In
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, under substantially the
same facts, it was held the officer "must be here officially, representing the corporation in its business", and the service was set
aside. In the Grant case supra, at page 249, the Court of Appeals
recognizing the difference in the views of the two courts, declared
that while the New York rule was safer and wiser it would recognize and attempt to follow the Federal rule. The Grant case,
however, was one which fitted nicely into the Federal rule since
the Court held that the president was here in his official capacity,
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thus distinguishing it from the Pope case. However, in affirming
without opinion the case of Sadler v. B. & B. Rubber Co., 202 N.
Y. 547, the Court showed clearly that it had not receded one iota
from its position in the Pope case.
The principal case, while it involves Section 1780 of the Code,
raises a question different from any in the preceding cases. Here
service was made on a person designated by the corporation to
accept service of process. Such designation is a condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate authorizing the corporation
to do business in this State. (Gen. Corp. Law, Sec. 15.) The
Appellate Division affirmed the order setting the service aside on
the authority of Old Wayne Co. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 22 and
Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U. S. 115-130. In the latter
case the Court said, "But this power to designate by statute the
officer upon whom service in suits against foreign corporations
may be made relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction of the state enacting the law." The Court of Appeals, however, points out that, in both these cases, the corporation failed to
designate any person upon whom service might be made. In the
Simon case, a Louisiana statute required the corporation to designate a person to accept service, and in the event of failure to so
designate, service on the Secretary of State would be effective.
The Court held that such service could give jurisdiction only to
business transacted within the state. It expressly refused to pass
upon the question before the court in the principal case. (236 U. S.,
at p. 130.) In the Simon case, the Court held that the corporation,
by doing business in the state and failing to designate any person to
accept service, is estopped to deny the jurisdiction of the Court as to
actions arising out of business transacted within the state. It is
entirely conceivable that a court more equitably inclined might extend the doctrine to any cause of action. But the principal case, as
Judge Cardozo points out, involves the construction of a contract.
The State agrees to issue a certificate to the foreign corporation, if
the corporation agrees to designate a person upon whom process
against the corporation may be served. (Gen. Corp. Law, Sec.
15, 16.) "The actions in which he is to represent the corporation
are not limited. The meaning must therefore be that the appointment is for any action which under the laws of this State may
be brought against a foreign corporation. (Code Civil Procedure,
sections 1780, 432.)" This distinction has been recognized by the
Federal Courts in a decision subsequent to the Simon case. (Snzolik v. Philadelphia& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. .148.)
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There is a statement in the opinion in the principal case which
seems to indicate that the Court has abandoned its position in the
Pope case and the Sadler case discussed supra. It said that the
object of designating a person to accept service was to insure the
presence in the state of someone with authority equal to the president's in respect of the service of process. "It is true that even
the president of a foreign corporation may be here without bringing the corporation itself within the jurisdiction. He must be
here 'officially, representing the corporation in its business' (Conley
v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406; Kendall v. American
Automatic Loom Co., 198 U. S. 477; Goldey v. Morning News,
156 U. S. 518). To give judgment in violation of that rule is to
condemn the corporation unheard, and to ignore the essentials of
due process of law. Dicta to the contrary in Grant v. Cananea
Copper Co., 189 N. Y. 241 must yield to the later decision in
Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 192." Not only the
dicta in the Grant case, but the decisions in the Pope case supra,
and the Sadler case, supra, are squarely contra to the Riverside
Mills case, and whether these decisions will yield to the decision
in the Riverside case is yet to be decided.

ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGs-RECOGNITION By NEW YoRx
COURTS OF FOREIGN STATUTORY TRANSFER OF PROPERTY WITHIN

THIS STATE.-A Pennsylvania corporation, which had been duly
transacting business in New York, was duly dissolved by a Pennsylvania court, and title to all its assets was, by such court, transferred to the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance, pursuant
to statute. As a result of such dissolution, refunds became due
in New York from a reinsuring corporation to such Commissioner, and refunds also became due from such Commissioner to
plaintiff's assignors. Plaintiff brought action, in New York, for
his refunds, against the defunct corporation by name, attaching
as its assets the refunds due from the reinsurer. The Pennsylvania Commissioner appeared specially on a motion to vacate the
attachment. Held, the attachment must be vacated. (Martyne v.
Amer. Union Fire Insurance Co., 216 N. Y. 183.)
New York courts have consistently refused to recognize the
title of a foreign assignee in insolvency or bankruptcy, as against
any creditor attaching assets here, and have, with equal consistency,
conceded their own limitations in such proceedings to affect assets
not situated here, as against attachments in the place where the
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assets are. (Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230; Warner v. Jaffray,
96 N. Y. 248.) On the other hand, they give full credit to a
foreign assignment of assets here, provided the assignment operates under the common law. (Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. .Y. 29.)
The Court in the principal case seems to have reached its decision
on the theory that the growing tendency to recognize the sovereign acts of the various states justifies extending recognition in
New York to the transfer, by judicial decree of a Pennsylvania
court, of assets in New York from one Pennsylvania resident to
another. The opinion states that the principle of the insolvency
cases is not to be extended. It is submitted that a discussion
of the doctrine of comity was not necessary here. There
is nothing in the New York statutes which interferes with
the dissolving power of the home sovereignty of a corporation,
merely because such corporation is authorized to do business in
this State. Although plaintiff's action was aimed at merely the
attached assets, it was still an action only quasi in rem. (Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.) The assets in every such case must be
the property of the nominal defendant, answering for his personal wrong; and a dead defendant is no defendant. It would
seem that the question of comity would not be squarely raised
unless the action had been against the Pennsylvania Commissioner,
by name; but the opinion, at least, shows the present tendency of
the Court of Appeals.

EQUITY-CANCE"I.ATION-OvERDUE

NOTES

OBTAINED

BY

FnAtuD.-Plaintiff gave notes to one Garifalos for discount at a
certain bank upon the latter's false representation that he had
a line of credit there. Garifalos negotiated them to the defendants who took with notice of the fraud. The notes being now
overdue, plaintiff sues for an injunction against their further
negotiation and for their surrender and cancellation. Held, cancellation decreed. (Warnock Uniform Co. v. Silver et al, Appellate Division, First Department, 156 N. Y. Supp. 637.)
A court of equity has jurisdiction to cancel a writing obtained
by fraud. (Kent, Ch., in Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns. Chanc.
517.) But unless it is clear that there is grave danger of irreparable injury, New York courts have been slow to exercise this
jurisdiction. (Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373; Globe Co. v.
Reals, 79 N. Y. 202.) Especially is this true where there is an
adequate defence to the instrument at law, and the only danger
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is loss of evidence of that defence. Where notes are overdue,
so that the defence at law cannot be nullified by a transfer to
a holder in due course, it seems settled in New York that equity
will not give relief for mere fraud in obtaining the instrument.
(Geer v. Kissam, 3 Edw. Chanc. 137, in which there is a dictum
that the danger of transfer to a bona fide purchaser alone should
afford ground for exercise of the jurisdiction.) The majority
in the instant case cites Fuller v. Percival, 126 Mass. 281, which
is squarely in point, and which represents the Massachusetts view.
But the New York decision cited (Springport v. Teutonia Bank,
75 N. Y. 397) explicitly states (p. 403) that mere danger of
losing evidence is not a reason impelling Equity to act, and has
moreover the fact that in that case the notes were not due, and
could be negotiated to an innocent buyer.
The fact that there were fifteen notes in this case should give
no jurisdiction in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, as the
separate knowledge of each defendant would have to be proven,
even after the establishment of the principal fraud. (Hale v. Allson, 188 U. S. 56.) In any view, the decision seems contra to
the long established law of the state. If so, the change in the
rule is beneficial. It appears inequitable to refuse relief to a person
in the situation of the plaintiff, leaving him open to embarrassment to his credit by the very fact that the notes remain outstanding, unpaid and apparently valid. This it would seem influenced
the Court to reach the conclusion it did.
DOMESTIC

RELATIONS--HUSBAND

AND

WIFE-SEPARATION

demurrer was interposed to a complaint, in an action brought by a
wife for a separation, alleging acts of cruelty committed prior to
and continuing up to the time she and her husband entered into
an agreement, which provided for the payment of a weekly allowance for the maintenance of herself and child and an allotment
of the husband's property, and which also provided that they
should live apart and not interfere in any way or manner with each
other. The demurrant attacked the complaint on the ground of its
insufficiency, arguing that the agreement as to separation precluded plaintiff from bringing this action. Held, that while the
agreement was binding with respect to the provisions for the payment of alimony, it was not valid as an agreement that the parties
shall*continue to live apart and it is not per se a bar to this action.
AGREEMENTS-ALIMONY-SUFFICIENCY

OF A COMPLAINT.-A
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(Landes v. Landes, N. Y. Supreme Court, 54 N. Y. Law Journal
2099.)
Sound public policy forbids our courts giving validity to an
agreement for the future maintenance of a wife, except where the
agreement is made in contemplation of immediate separation,
which separation in fact ensued, or after separation had actually
occurred and still continued. (Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677;
Calkins v. Long, 22 Barb. 97; Bishop on Mar. and Div., §§ 637650.) But where the agreement is made under these conditions
the courts will enforce the provisions for maintenance, even after
a judgment for divorce has been obtained by the wife for the husband's subsequent adultery. (Galush v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635,
6 L. R. A. 487; Duryea v. Bliven, 122 N. Y. 567.) The
English courts hold agreements made under these conditions
are valid and enftrcible both as to separation and as to maintenance (McGregor v. McGregor,21 Q. B. Div. 424, 1888; Marshall
v. Marshall, 5 Prob. Div. 19), but the majority of the courts of
this country support the holding in the principal case. (Allen v.
Allen, 73 Conn. 54; Albee v. Wyman, 10 Gray 222; Grinie v. Borden, 166 Mass. 198; Bixby v. Moor, 51 N. H. 402; Foote v. Nickerson, 54 L. R. A. 554; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich., 563; Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553, 563; Andrus v. Raudon, 34
Texas 536.)
It seems that a mutual undertaking that the parties shall live
apart cannot be relied upon as furnishing any element of the consideration of a separation agreement; for "a husband and wife
cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage". (Dom. Rel.
Law, Sec. 51.)
BILLS
AND
DRAWEE, WHEm

NOTES-CERTIFIED
PAYMENT

HAS

BEEN

CIIECKS--LIABILITY
SToPPED.-Plaintiff

OF

was

payee of check drawn on defendant. Drawer stopped payment
but the defendant subsequently certified check when presented by
the plaintiff. The latter deposited check in another bank and
payment was later refused by defendant. Held, plaintiff cannot
recover as he has suffered no loss on the strength of the certification, the drawer being still liable for the amount because of the
stop-order. (Bladinger & Kupferman Mfg. Co. v. Manufacturerd-Citizens' Trust Co., Appellate Term, Second Department, 156
N. Y. Supp. 445.)
Where the holder of a check procures it to be accepted or
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certified, the drawer and all endorsers are discharged from liability
thereon. (Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 324.) And the
drawee or acceptor is liable. (Daniel on Negotiable Instruments,
Secs. 1603-1604; First National Bank v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350;
Anglo-South American Bank v. National City Bank, 161 App.
Div. 275; Meuer v. The Phenix National Bank, 94 App. Div. 331,
affd. 183 N. Y. 511). Where the stop order is given one hour after
certification, though the payee has not changed his position, the
drawee is still liable. (Carnegie Trust Co. v. First National Bank,
etc., 213 N. Y. 301.) Also a bona fide holder who procured the
certification after stop order was given to bank was allowed to
recover from bank. (Meuer v. The Phenix National Bank, supra.)
The Court in the case last cited did not consider the fact that the
stop order was given before check was certified and that plaintiff
had not altered his position.
However, where a bank certifies a check to be good under the
mistaken belief that the drawer has sufficient funds or any funds
on deposit, or where the bank has been induced to certify check
by fraudulent representation, the certification may be revoked
before there is any inequitable change of circumstances. (Daniel
on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 1608; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Toler,
65 Hun 187; National Bank v. Steele & Johnson Co., 58 Hun 81;
Mt. Morris Bank v. 23d Ward Bank, 172 N. Y. 244.) The rule
in the principal case appears to be an equitable extension of this
latter exception to the general rule. The case is contrary on the
facts to Meuer v. Phenix National'Bank, supra.

CARRIERS.M-WAREHOUSEMAN'S LIABILITY.--CARMACK AMENDMENT.-Plaintiff shipped goods over connecting lines from Denver,
Col. to Cleveland, 0., under a bill of lading, recommended by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which provided that the arfibr
was liable only for the declared value at the place of shipment,
and that property not removed within 48 hours after notice of
arrival was held subject to a warehouseman's liability. The plaintiff's agent declared upon the face of the bill that the value of the
property did not exceed $10.00 per cwt., and the court found as
a fact that the plaintiff received a consideration for the limitation
through a reduction in freight charges. The goods reached their
destination on defendant company's railroad on September 27,
were not called for by the plaintiff, and on November 1, were
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destroyed by the negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff brought
action in the state court of Ohio, the case by successive appeals
reaching the Supreme Court of the United States. Held that the
Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of 1906 applies not
only to goods in transit but also to the liability of a carrier as a
warehouseman, and that the reduced rate of carriage constitutes
sufficient consideration for the limitation of the warehouseman's
liability. (Cleveland & St. Louis Ry. v. Dettlebach, 239 .U. S.
588.)
The question presented by this appeal arose in the Supreme
Court prior to the present case, but the Court refused to pass
upon the issue here involved. (Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker,
233 U. S. 97, 109.) That the reduced rate of shipment is sufficient consideration for the limitation of liability as a carrier is
now too well settled to be questioned, however unsound this may
be on principle. (Adams Express v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491,
509; Mo. Kans. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 668.)
Moreover the instant case does not present any question of
estoppel, the sole ground of the decision being the contract entered
into between the parties, in line with former federal decisions,
which decide cases of this nature on a contract basis. In the
light of the cases last above cited, which all allow the limitation
solely because of the reduced rate, the argument stated by the
lower court for refusing to extend the limitation to the warehouseman's liability seems very strong. The lower court said "* * *
The reduction, in the rate of carriage which can be used as a
consideration to support that agreement, is no consideration for
a like limitation of the liability as a warehouseman, because there
is no reduction in warehousing charges provided or stipulated
for in the transaction."
The Supreme Court, though recognizing the cogency of the
lower Court's reasoning, overrules it on the ground that it is
contrary to the spirit of the Carmack amendment (34 Stat. 584
c. 3591), which broadens the meaning of the word "transportation," as used in the original Interstate Commerce Act, and makes
it as general as possible. The opinion holds that Congress intended
by the passage of the above Act to exact uniformity in service
and charges, to make the carriers' undertaking an entire one, and
to do away with the common law distinctions between the liability
of a carrier and that of a warehouseman. The case results, it
would seem, in an important and very favorable position for
modem carriers, but doubtful security for the shippers, so that

